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EXTERNAL  DEBT,  PLANNING  HORIZON AND DISTORTED  CREDIT MARKETS 
ANsTCT 
The purpose of this paper is to study the role of policies in the presence of country 
risk with overdiscountirig  by the  policy  maker. Overdiscounting  may reflect  political 
uncertainty, which makes the effective  planning horizon  of the centralized government 
shorter than that of  the private sector. The  consequence  of  overdiscounting  is to shift 
the supply curve facing the economy  leftwards.  The role of optimal borrowing  policies in 
the presence of  country  risk  is  to  discourage  borrowing  for consumption purposes, 
encourage investment in openness, and discourage investment in activities that reduce 
openness. The effect of overdiscounting  by the policy maker is to increase the values of 
the optimal policy instruments  (i.e.  to increase the magnitude of  the borrowing  taxes 
and subsidies). Increasing  the relative importance of open  activities can be viewed as a 
way  to  reduce the harmful  consequences  of  overdiscounting. Overdiscounting may 
rationalize various conditionality clauses that will induce the economy to follow the 
desired credit market  policies. 
Joshua Aizenman 
The  Hebrew  University 
Jerusalem,  Israel 
011-972-2-8  83249 1.  INTRODUCTION  AND SUMMARY 
Most developing countries are presently credit rationed in the international credit 
markets. This is reflected in the segmentation of the international  and domestic credit 
markets.  The domestic market is  characterized  by  high real interest rates  where 
domestic agents find it impossible to raise new external credit. As is well documented in 
the literature, this situation is related to substantial borrowing  in the seventies followed 
by  the reversal  of  the  easy  borrowing  policy  in  the  early eighties.  This  reversal 
corresponds to  the  growing  awareness  to  the  role  of  country risk  in  determining 
international credit flows1. 
The experience of  the debtor countries in recent years suggests  that  there are 
tight linkages between the political infrastructure  in the various countries and the debt 
problem.  Obviously, these linkages  are not  unique to the debt  issue,  and a  growing 
literature has studied the interaction between political structure and the economy. The 
purpose  of this paper is to focus on one dimension of these linkages- the possibility  that 
the planning horizon of  the policy maker  differs from that of the economic  agent. This 
issue may be of special relevance for the default decisions in the context of country risk. 
Typically,  the default decision against external creditors is undertaken  by a centralized 
policy maker whose decision affects  the private debtors in his country. The purpose of 
this  study  is  to  investigate the  consequences  of  discrepancies between  the  policy 
makers  and  the  private  agents  planning  horizons.  The  importance  of  differences 
1  For  an analysis of  country risk  see, for example,  Harberger (1976), 
Kharas  (1981),  Eaton and  Gersovitz  (1981),  Sachs  (1984),  Kletzer  (1984),  Krugman 
(1985)  Smith and Cuddington  (1985), Edwards (1985),  Folkerts-Landau (1985),  Dooley 
(1986),  Aizenman  (1986),  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1986),  Calvo  (1987),  Helpman  (1987), 
Alesina and Tabelline (1987) and Aizenman and Borensztein  (1988). 2 
between  the plannir. horizons  of  the private and the public sectors has been recently 
highlighd  in  the context  of  fiscal  policy.  A  growing literature 
2  has  attributed 
deviations from Ricardian Equivalence  to the possibility that the private sector operates 
with  a shorter planning horizon  relative  to  the  public  sector  because  of  life-time 
uncertainty.  An  important  characteristic  of  country  risk  is  that  the  opposite 
presumption may  apply -  because  of  political  uncertainty,  the  effective  planning 
horizon of  the centralized government may be  shorter than that of  the private sector. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the economic consequences  of this presumption. 
This research has both positive  and normative  aspects.  At the normative level, it 
is  well  understood that  country  risk  may  imply that  competitive equilibrium  is 
inefficient,  This result  may explain  the role of  credit market policies,  yet it  cannot 
explain why, frequently, such policies are not voluntarily implemented by the indebted 
countries themselves. We have frequently observed that rescheduling  agreements entail 
various conditionality clauses attached  to the provision  of  fresh credit. One  purpose of 
our analysis is to demonstrate that various conditionality clauses  may be  rationalized 
in a framework where the planning horizon of the centralized decision maker is shorter 
than that of the representative agent. 
We start our analysis by considering the  positive  aspects  of  planning horizon 
discrepancy:  we investigate how it affects the behavior of the debtor nation and of the 
international credit  market.  We  specially investigate the  consequences  of  planning 
horizon discrepancies on the investment  undertaken  by  the  private  sector. First  we 
present  the  case  where  the  only source  of  uncertainty stems  from  uncertainties 
regarding the centralized decision makers discount factor.  The Appendix  demonstrates 
that symmetrical  results can  be obtained for the case where the centralized decision 
makers discount factor is known, and the uncertainty  stems from a stochastic default 
2  See, for example,  Blanchard (1985), and Frenkel and Razin (1986). 3 
penalty. Then  we  explore  the  normative  consequences of  exogenous  changes in  the 
various variables, such as the volume of investment and consumption borrowing.  Such 
a change may be implemented by conditionality arrangements that set guidelines  for 
domestic credit market policies  We derive the desirable conditions  characterizing the 
proper conditionality in t}i presence of a limited planning horizon of  the centralized 
decision maker. These conditions are defined by the policies that maximize the expected 
utility of the representative agent in the economy. We close  the paper with concluding 
remarks regarding extensions and qualifications. 
Our key results are that the consequence  of  overdiscounting  by the policy maker 
is  to  mft  the  supply  of  credit  facing  the economy leftwards. The  role  of  optimal 
borrowing policies  in  the presence of  country risk  is  to  discourage  borrowing for 
consumption purposes, encourage investment in openness, and discourage investment in 
3 
activities that reduce openness  The rationale for these policies is that investment  in 
openness generates positive externality: it increases the penalty associated with default, 
thereby bonding  the policy maker and the country  to honor their  financial obligations, 
shifting rightward the supply  of credit facing the country. The economic agent does not 
have the incentive to internalize this effect, and the role of policies is to induce him to 
do  it  by  taxing  activities  that  reduce  openness,  and  subsidizing  (relative  to  the 
competitive equilibrium)  activities that increase openness. 
The effect of overdiscounting  by the policy maker is to increase the values of the 
optimal  policy  instruments.  Overdiscounting increases the  optimal  investment  in 
openness, and reduces the optimal investment in activities that are not  biased towards 
3  Throughout the  paper  we  refer  to  openness  as  synonymous with  trade 
dependency.  A  country is  more  open  if  its  welfare  depends  more  heavily  on 
international trade, or alternatively if it faces higher costs of trade embargo. 4 
openness.  Overdiscounting  can  be  viewed  as  a  new  distortion:  the  policy  maker 
understates the future penalty triggered by default. Consequently,  the decision maker 
defaults too frequently relative to the default rate that maximizes the welfare of  the 
representative consumer.  This distortion operates on the top of the distortion introduced 
by country  risk, Increasing the openness of the economy increases the costs of  default 
and  reduces the  incidence  of  non-optimal defaults,  mitigating thereby  the  harmful 
consequences  of the distortion generated by the policy makers short horizon. 
In  the  presence  of  overdiscounting these  policies  will  not  be  implemented 
voluntarily by the decision maker, because he  is not maximizing the welfare of  the 
representative  consumer. An obvious  source of  a  distortion  in the presence of  short 
planning  horizon  is  the  default  rule  in  the  indebted  country.  Assuming  a  given 
institutional  structure  we  cannot  affect  the  default  rule.  Instead,  a  proper 
conditionality  may  reduce  the  consequences  of  that  distortion.  Consequently, 
implementing the policies that maximize the welfare of the  representative  consumer 
will require various conditionality clauses  that will induce  the economy to follow the 
desired credit market policies. S 
2. THE  MODEL 
We construct a simple model  to evaluate the dependency of investment decisions 
and  policies on the planning horizon in the presence of  country risk.  There are three 
periods.  In  the first period  agents in the economy make the borrowing  decisions.  The 
borrowed funds are used to finance investment or consumption.  To simplify we assume 
that,  due to  relative scarcities of  funds, the first  period  investment  is  financed by 
external borrowing.  Repayment is due in the second period. Default in the second period 
triggers a penalty that reduces available resources in the second and third periods.  The 
default decision is made by a centralized policy maker, such as the central bank, who 
compares the costs and the benefits of a default  -fault will occur if the costs fall short 
of the benefits associated  with the default. We  udy an economy where the central 
4 
decision makers  planning horizon differs  from that  of  the  representative  agent  We 
present the case  where  the discount factor applied  by the centralized decision maker 
may  differ  from  the  one  applied  by  the  private  agent.  In  period  one  there  is 
uncertainty regarding the identity of the decision  maker in  period  two,  and  thus 
regarding his future discount factor. The  decision  makers discount factor  is  e 
where  0  ￿  s  1.  is  a  random  variable. The  available information in  period  one  is 
summarized by a distribution function of the future  values of t, denoted by f(e). 
To simplify analysis we consider risk neutral  agent whose utility is given by 
4  Because the only decision made by the centralized decision maker concerns 
the default decision in period  two  we need at least three periods  in order to evaluate 
the role of  planning horizon. 
5  All the key results of  the present paper apply also to the case  of  a  general 
utility. 6 
1  12 
(1)  U  C1 +  C2 + (;) C3 
where  8 stands for the subjective rate of time preference and C1  is the consumption of 
traded  goods at time t (t =  1, 23). 
The role of the centralized decision maker is  limited to the default decision and to 
the implementation of credit market policies. These policies are in the form of borrowing 
taxes for consumption and  investment  purposes.  We assume  that  if  the country  is 
facing credit rationing the policy maker  will impose the appropriate tax on consumption 
borrowing,  denoted by p. The purpose of this tax is to capture the wedge between the 
external supply price of  credit and the domestic price of  credit needed to clear  the 
6 
domestic  market for credit  The domestic interest rates are given by 
(2)  1 + r  =  (1 + r*) (1 + p)  ;  1  + r1 =  (1 + r*) (1 + j) 
where r  is the external interest rate facing the country, and p is the domestic tax on 
borrowing  f  or investment in activity i, 0 ' i  q. 
The budget constraints for a representative consumer are given by 
(3)  C= Yi÷B 
q 
(4)  C2, = 2,n 
—  (B (1  r) +  l(1÷r1)} + R ;  C2,d 
=  2,d 
i= 1 
(5)  C3, 
= 2,n  C3,d  2,d 
6  For further discussion  regarding  the role of such a tax see Aizenman (1987). 7 
where Ct,d  (Yt.d)  and Ct (Y)  stand for consumption (G.N.P.) at  time t in case  of 
default (d)  and  no  default (n),  respectively. Consumption borrowing  and  investment 
borrowing in activity  i are denoted by B0 and I, respectively. Lump-sum transfers are 
given by R. 
The  role  of  the  lump-stir  transfer s to  rebate  the  public  of  the net tax  collection 
generated by credit market policies. To simplify, we focus on the case where investment 
decisions are carried only in the first period, and we assume equality of output in the 
second and third period. 
Suppose that the value added  in sector i depends on two  factors. First, it may be 
affected by the decision regarding default. For  example,  if  default raises  the costs of 
imported inputs it will  tend  to depress output.  Second, the value added in  sector i 
depends  positively  on  the  capital  stock,  which  in  turn  is  determined  by  past 
investment. We can summarize the value addec in sector i at time t by: 
't;i (n, K.1)  if no default occurs 
(6)  = 
''t;i (d, Kt)  if default occurs 
The GNP in our economy is the sum of the value added in all activities, given by 
q 
= 8 
where s =  ri or d (no default or default, respectively) and there are q sectors.7  Equation 
(7) should be viewed as a reduced form equation, and Appendix A.1 provides a detailed 
example of the factors determining the value added. 
We define  the default penalty (denoted by  (2)  as the drop  in the GNP resultant 
from the default:  '' - ''t  (see Appendix A.1  for the analysis regarding the 
factors determining  (2). 
The default decision is made by the centralized decision maker who compares the 
cost of default (given by the drop of output by (2 in period two and three) to the gain  in 
q 
period two, given by (1 + r*)B, where  B is aggregate borrowing,  given by  B  = B +  I.  i'  1 
Thus, default will occur if 
(8)  (1+r*)  >  (2(1 
The right-hand  side stands for net present value  of  the default penalty, discounted to 
the second  period  applying the  decision makers discount factor,  .  In the first 
period  is unknown, and the information on  its  possible value  is summarized  by a 
8 
density function f(€) . Let ij be the marginal value of  associated  with default, and 
defined by: 
7  Note that the GNP  is a function also of  the vector of capital (Kj, Kt,2 
Kt,q). For notational simplicity this vector is suppressed. 
8  To simplify the discussion  we treat the political ml: astructure  generating 
overdiscounting as  exogenously  given.  One  example  of  an  economy generating  our 
results is the case  where the governments effective tax collection  is a fixed proportion 9 
(8)  (1+r)  = 
Assuming symmetric  informatlon between lenders and  borrowers, if the lenders 
are risk neutral they will require an interest rate r* such as 
(9)  j+r1=(1+r)fl 
where r  is the risk free interest rate and 
(9')  fl =  f(e) de 
Note  that  Vt  is the probability  of  no  default,  and  equation  (9)  requires  equality  of 
expected yield and  risk-free yield.  The  representative agent  in the economy is fully 
informed  about the decision rule  guiding the centralized decision  maker. His  expected 
utility is given by 
of  the private sectors consumption, and  these taxes are  used  to  finance the  fiscal 
consumption.  Let e be the probability of government's survival from the second to the 
third period. The government preferences are given by a separate utility function [like 
(1)]  where we  replace  the private sector by government consumption (i.e.,  the public  j2 
sectors utility is  j  G2 + (}  G3  , and G = t C )  .  It can be shown that if, in that 
economy,  the government maximizes its expected utility we may generate a  default 
rule of the type summarized by (8).  This is only one  possible example of  an economy 
where the results of our policy discussion may be relevant. 10 
(10) 
+  iY2—  c1){1  +  ) f(e) d  + 
1  q  1 
j  1''2,n + R 
— (B (1 + r)  +  I(1'-r1)} +  T  2,n  f(c)  dc 
0  i1 
where the second and third terms stand for the expected  net present value conditional 
on default and no default decision, respectively. 11 
3. BORROWING FOR CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT: THE AGENT PROBLEM 
A  representative agent will choose consumption and  investment  as to maximize 
the expected  utility, given by (10). Assuming  that each  agent  is price taker, he views 
his borrowing  as negligible relative to the aggregate borrowing of  the country. Thus, he 
treats the probability of  default (and consequently c0)  as  being  exogenously  given to 
him.  The  condition  for  optimal  consumption  borrowing  (assuming  an  internal 
equilibrium) is obtained by maximizing (10): 
(11)  1  =  (1+r)  U 
Applying (2) and (9) we get a unique borrowing  tax consistent with internal equilibrium 
with positive  borrowing. This tax is given by 
(12)  =  (8 - rf)/(1 + r) 
Since we assumed that consumers are risk neutral  and that the rate of time preference 
rate is constant, then for a tax rate below  consumers will borrow until the credit 
constraint is reached, and  for  a tax rate above  p  no borrowing for consumption will 
occur  We will assume an internal equilibrium where the tax  p  is imposed. At that 
9  Once the credit constraint  is  reached the policy maker will impose  the tax 
to capture  the wedge  between the external supply  price of  credit and  the  domestic 
price  of  credit that  is needed to  clear the domestic market for credit.  For  further 
discussion regarding the role of such a tax see Aizenman (1987). 12 
tax consumers are indifferent to  the volume of  consumption borrowing.  As  we  will 
demonstrate later the optimal level of consumption borrowing will be obtained by also 
taking  into  consideration the  social  consequences of  country risk  on  the  default 
penalty. 
The investment in activity  i is determined by the following condition [derived by 
10 
maximizing  (10)1 
(13)  NVMP1  =  (1 + rf)(1 + p) 
where  NVMP1 = ( 
- {1 - 1fl  1 +  ) 
This condition equates the net present value of the marginal productivity of investment 
to the expected  marginal costs of investment. ['ote that the left hand side of (13) is the 
expected net  present  value  of  the  marginal  product  of  investment,  taking  into 
consideration the consequences  of the investment on the expected default penalty. The 
right hand side is the expected  cost of borrowing.  We close this section  by evaluating 
the consequences  the overdiscounting  on the supply of credit facing the country  and on 
the level of investment.  Appendix  A.3  demonstrates that  higher overdiscounting will 
shift the supply credit facing the economy leftward. Thus,  given  borrowing  will be 
associated with a  raise in  the interest  rate facing  the country and  a  drop  in  the 
probability of repayment  (TI).  Inspection  of  the investment rule  (13)  shows  that this 
10  We use the fact that  (9) implies that 
(1 +  rf)/(1 + r*) = 
Jf() 
d€ 
Y2  ttf  Q  1 
11.  Alternatively,  NVMP  =  -  y)( 
1 + 13 
adjustment implies  a  drop  in  the  expected  marginal  product  of  capital,  thereby 
reducing the investment. 
4. OPTIMAL BORROWING: OVERDISCOUNTING  AND THE ROLE  OF POLICIES  AND 
CONDITIONALITY 
We would like to evaluate  the role  of policies in the presence of  limited planning 
horizon.  These  policies  may  be  either  in  the  form  of  conditionality  imposed  by 
international  institutions  or  in  the  form  of  taxes  and  subsidies  implemented 
domestically.  The presumption is that in the presence of  overdiscounting these policies 
will  not  be  implemented voluntarily  by  the  decision  maker,  because  he  is  not 
12 
maximizing the welfare of  the representative consumer  .  Consequently,  implementing 
the policies that maximize the  welfare of  the  representative  consumer may require 
various  conditionality clauses.  We  start  our analysis  by  evaluating  how  marginal 
change  in  borrowing will  affect  the  expected  utility.  We  can  accomplish  this  by 
differentiating the expected utility  subject to the constraint on the supply of credit lie., 
where c0 and r* are determined by (8) and (9)] 
13 
The expected utility  is given by 
12  Maximizing  the  welfare  of  the  representative  consumer  will  require  a 
default rule  like  (8)  with  no  overdiscounting (i.e.,  with t  =  1).  As  is  elaborated in 
footnote 8,  the  decision  rule  in  our  paper  may  reflect  uncertainty regarding  the 
survival of  the policy  maker and  is consistent with the case  where  the policy  maker 
maximizes his own expected welfare. 
13.  Equation (14) is obtained by applying the assumption that the  lump-sum 
transfers are rebating the consumer of the net collection of borrowing  taxes. 14 
(14)  V= 
1  1  q 
+ 
i+&J  '2 - } f()d +  j—j  (V2 
—  (1+r*)(Bc  +  l)}f() dc 
0  0  i=1 
1  2rc  1  211 
÷ () ) 
(Y2— Q)f() de  ÷ (;g)  J  Y2 f(€) d 
0  0 
As is shown in Appendix A.2 ,  marginal changes in B0 and I (i  =  1, ...q) will change the 
expected utility by: 
(15)  AV= 
1r1  B 
{t- ---- (1+—n{1+Ufl}80 
+ 
q 
1{NvMP1 —(1+rf)[1+Tri(1+U}1}lj  ii. 
(21(1+6) 
where U =  —  *  (1  Eo);  rj0  d log (1 + r*)/ d log B0 
B(1+r 
and  d log (1 + r*)/ d log I. 
U measures the relative importance of overdiscounting the future default costs by the 
14 
policy maker, and it is zero if no overdiscounting  occurs (i.e. if 
=  1)  n and ri are 
14.  Note  that  /(1+6)  is  the  decision  makers  marginal  discount  factor 
associated with  default. For  this  decision  maker the future costs of  default  are  (2 
c0/(1+8) (in terms of  the second  period).  For  the economic  agent the future costs  of 15 
the elasticities of  the interest  rate with respect  to  borrowing for consumption and 
investment. 
Equation (15) has been derived for the case  where the source of  uncertainty is 
stochastic rate  of  time  preference (or equivalently  stochastic  overdiscounting).  Our 
welfare  discussion  in  thi  section  will  be  based  on  that  equation.  Appendix  A.4 
demonstrates that the same equation can be derived for the case where the source of 
uncertainty is stochastic future productivity and  where the overdiscounting by  the 
decision maker is exogenously given. Consequently, it can  be  shown that all the welfare 
discussion  in this  section  applies  to both cases:  stochastic productivity and  stochastic 
overdiscounting. 
Marginal  borrowing  will change welfare by the sum  of the initial distortion times 
the change in the distorted activity. The distortions in the various  activities are given 
by the terms in large brackets in (15), which measure the wedge between the marginal 
benefit  and the marginal social cost  associated with extending the distorted activities. 
For example, a raise in consumption at period one will increase welfare by 1, but will 
generate a marginal cost of 
1+r1  B  t +  r  1  +  U)].  The value  of  is the elasticity of  the interest  rate with 
respect to consumption  borrowing.  In the absence of country risk r 
=  0 and  the cost of 
borrowing  is simply given by the the risk-free interest rate discounted by the rate  of 
time preference. With country risk  and  full  discounting  (U=0)  the  social  cost  of 
01(1+5) 
default are 0 /(1+S) (in terms of the second period).  Consequently,  —  (1- o) is the 
B(1+r 
penalty  overdiscounted  by the decision maker relative to the debt due in the second 
period. 16 
15 
consumption borrowing is given by expected discounted increase in future repayment 
Country risk introduces a distortion that raises the social cost of  funds.  The distortion 
arises from the fact that individual borrowers treat the rate of  interest as given even 
though, from the perspective of  the country as a whole,  the rate of  interest  increases 
with the volume of consumption borrowing  due to the rise in the probability of default. 
Each small  consumer overlooks  the marginal rise in the probability of  default induced 
by his marginal borrowing.  The increase in the probability of default entails a negative 
externality because of the consequent rise in the expected default penalty  inflicted  on 
all domestic consumers. 
As  can  be  seen  from  (15),  country risk  increases the  expected  social  cost  of 
consumption borrowing  at a rate of  — r  (  1 +  U). If the policy maker's discount factor 
equals  that of  the economic  agent (i.e.,  if  1  =  e and thus U  =  0), the social cost will 
B 
increase at a rate given by the weighted interest rate elasticity (  Tb). The  implication 
of  overdiscounting by  the  policy  maker  is  that  the  policy  maker  defaults  too 
frequently', relative to the desired default by a representative  consumer, because he 
1t  d[(i.+r)B] 
15. Note that the social cost of consumption  borrowing  for  =  1 is i dB 
where  iT  is the probability of  no  default. Applying  definitions one  can  show that 
iT  d[(1+r*)B] 
1+8  dB 
= 
1+rf  B 
1 + — rid. This will  be the case with full discounting  by the policy maker ( =  1), 
where  the  uncertainty is  due  to  a  stochastic  default  penalty  generated  by  a 
productivity shock [see Aizenman (1987) for such an example,  and Appendix A.4  for an 
example with a fixed overdiscounting  in the presence of productivity shocki. 17 
overlooks  some of  the future costs of  default. This  result  in increasing the distortion 
B 
introduced by country risk by  n  U. 
L)c 
Similar interpretation applies  to  the welfare  change  introduced by  marginal 
investment  borrowing: th. benefit  of  investment  in period  two  is  NVMP1  (in  terms  of 
B 
the second  period). The marginal social cost of the funds is  (1  + rf)E  1  +  i  f  1  +  U)), 
nd country risk and short planning horizon increase the costs of funds at a rate of 
B 
We can apply (15) to infer the conditions  characterizing the optimal allocation, by 
equating the terms in the large brackets to zero.  This allocation  can  be  obtained by a 
proper conditionality. An obvious source  of distortion is  the default rule in the indebted 
country. This rule reflects the overdiscounting due to the limited planning horizon of 
the decision  maker.  Assuming  a  given institutional  structure we  cannot  affect the 
default rule. Instead, a proper conditionality may attempt to reduce the distortions 
(holding  the institutional structure as  given).  From  (15)  we  infer  that  the proper 
'quotas for consumption  and investment borrowing  are given by the conditions: 
8—r1  B 
(16)  =  —n[1+U) 
(17)  NVMP1 = (1+rf)[ 1+{  1  +U}] 
Recalling that with the borrowing  tax  p consumers are indifferent  to the volume of 
consumption borrowing, equation (16) determines the condition for the socially desirable 
level of  consumption borrowing.  Equation (17) determines the optimal investment  rule. 
Comparing  (17)  to  (13)  shows  that the optimal investment  can  be  implemented  by 18/ 
imposing inve5tment borrowing  taxes at a rate of p. With this tax the interest rate for 
investment in activity i is given by (1+r*)(1+pj), where 
B 
(18)  p1=  Tflj{l+U) 
Inspection  of  (16) and  (18) reveals that two key factors  determine  the  optimal 
borrowing  for consumption and investment in activity i. The first is the elasticity of  the 
interest rate with respect to use of  funds (y and  rfl),  and the second  is  the relative 
importance of the overdiscounting,  as measured by U.  As is shown in Appendix A.3, the 
elasticity  of  the  interest  rate  with  respect  to  borrowing  reflects  the  marginal 
contribution of the borrowing to the country risk characteristics of the economy, and is 
determined by the use of funds (see equations (A15) and (A19)). 
In the case  of  consumption  borrowing,  the interest  elasticity i reflects  the 
inverse of  the elasticity of  supply of credit, and it approaches infinity as we approach 
the credit ceiling. As is shown in Appendix  A.3,  in  the presence of  country risk r 
measures  the increase in  the probability of  default resultant from  the increase in 
indebtedness. Figure one  summarizes  the factors  determining the optimal  level  of 
16 
consumption  borrowing  .  In the absence  of overdiscounting  the consumption borrowing 
is given by Bi  , and with overdiscounting  it is given by B2.  A rise in country  risk (i.e. 
a higher r) or higher overdiscounting  will shift CC  (and CC) leftwards, thus reducing 
the desired level of consumption  borrowing. 
16.  Curves CC and CC  siop upwards, corresponding  to the assumption that due 
to the presence of country risk we operate on the upper sloping portion of  the supply  of 







































Unlike  consumption  borrowing,  marginal  investment  borrowing  affects  the 
interest  rate in two opposite  directions  (see  Appendix  A.3  for the derivation  of  this 
result).  Fir5t,  marginal  borrowing  raises  total  indebtedness, thus  increasing  the 
probability of default. This effect is similar  to that observed for consumption borrowing. 
Second, the investment also changes the productive capacity of  the economy, thereby 
17 
affecting the default penalty  and the probability  of  default  .  We  refer to  these two 
effects  as the indebtedness and  openness  effects.  The  indebtedness effect  reflects  an 
upward move on the given supply of credit facing the economy, whereas the openness 
effect reflects the consequences of  the investment  on  the  location  of  the  supply of 
18 
credit  .  As is shown in Appendix  A.3,  the elasticity r  is the sum of  both effects  (see 
(A19)). The optimal borrowing tax balances these two effects. The stronger the openness 
effect, the lower  the optimal investment borrowing  tax (18), and if the openness effect 
dominates, the elasticity ij and the corresponding  borrowing  tax will be negative. 
Figure 2 describes opti'mal investment. Curve NVMP depicts the dependency  of  the 
expected marginal productivity of capital on the investment. We consider investment in 
two types  of  activities,  according  to  their  relative  openness,  as  measured  by  the 
elasticity .  The elasticity i is negative (positive) for a sector biased  in favor (against) 
international trade.  This point is developed  and justified in  Appendix  A.3,  where  we 
provide the economic interpretation for the bias in favor (or against) trade in terms of 
the relative importance of the sector in determining the default penalty. In Figure  2 we 
describe the investment in two activities that differ in  terms  of  their  openness  as 
reflected in the value of i. We denote the elasticities  of  the 'relatively  open and closed 
17.  For example,  investment in a sector  that depends heavily on international 
trade raises the default penalty and reduces thereby the probability of default. 
18. Note that the location  of the supply of credit facing the economy is conditional 






























activity by lo and r.  The level of optimal investment in the open sector is given by 10,1 
and 'o2 for the case  where there is no overdiscounting (U  =  0)  and the case where 
there  is  overdiscounting (U  >  0)  ,  respectively.  Similarly,  the  level  of  optimal 
investment in the relative closed sector  is  given by 'ci and  1c2  for the case where 
19 
overdiscounting  U  =  0 and U  0, respectively  .  Note that in the absence of investment 
policies there is  a uniform interest  rate applied  for all activities. Thus,  the  role of 
optimal investment policies is to encourage investment  in openness,  and  to discourage 
investment in activities that reduce openness. As is shown in Appendix A.3, a rise in the 
openness  of  an activity  reduces the corresponding Th  shifting down the  horizontal 
20 
schedule in Figure  2  ,  thus increasing the optimal investment. The rationale for this 
effect is  that investment in openness  generates positive  externality: it  increases the 
penalty  associated with default,  thereby bonding  the  country  to  honor  its  financial 
obligations,  thus  shifting  rightward  the  supply schedule  facing  the  country.  The 
economic agent does not have the incentive  to internalize this  effect,  and the role  of 
policies is to  induce  him to  do  so  by taxing activities that reduce  openness,  and  by 
subsidizing (relative to the competitive equilibrium)  activities that increase openness. 
Figure 2 also shows the optimal investment consequence  of higher overdiscounting 
the  policy  maker  (i.e.  an  increase  in  U).  It  tends  to  encourage investment  in 
openness,  and  to  discourage  investment  in  activities that  are not  biased  towards 
openness.  In  terms  of  Figure  2,  a  higher  U  will  shift  upwards  (downwards) the 
horizontal line for activities with positive (negative) r, reducing (increasing) the optimal 
investment. Thus,  overdiscounting by the  policy  maker  should  increase the optimal 
19.  In Figure 2  we assume that both sectors have the same expected  marginal 
productivity schedule.  — 
B 
20.  This is the schedule given by (1 + r)( 1 + 21 
investment in sectors biased in favor of  trade and  reduce the optimal investment  in 
activities not  biased  in  favor of  trade.  Increasing  the  relative  Importance  of  open 
activities  can  be  viewed  as  a  way  to  reduce  the  harmful  consequences  of 
overdiscounting. 
Overdiscounting  can be viewed  as a new distortion: the policy maker understates 
the future penalty triggered by default.  Consequently,  the decision  maker defaults too 
frequently relative to the default rate that maximizes the welfare of the representative 
consumer.  This distortion operates in addition to of the distortion introduced by country 
risk. The role of  optimal policies is to mitigate the effect  of  overdiscounting:  increasing 
the openness  of the economy increases the costs of default and reduces the incidence  of 
non-optimal defaults, mitigating thereby  the harmful consequences of the distortion 
generated by the policy  makers  short horizon.  Optimal  policies also  call for a further 
reduction in consumption borrowing;  the short-horizon of  the policy  maker causes too 
frequent defaults (relative to what  is optimal for the  representative  consumer), and 
tightening consumption borrowing can  be  viewed  as another way  of  reducing the 
frequency  of  the  non-optimal  defaults.  Note  that  as  long  as  the  policy  maker's 
consumption (or the public  sector's consumption) is positively correlated with private 
consumption, optimal policies  in  the  presence of  overdiscounting will  call  for  fiscal 
21 
contraction  It  is  noteworthy  that  the optimal  policies  have been derived  by 
maximizing the representative consumers welfare.  In  the presence of  overdiscounting 
by the policy maker these optimal policies will  deviate from  those policies viewed  &s 
21.  This result  follows from  the  observation that  part  of  the  borrowing  for 
coniumption may be used to increase the public  sectors consumption. Consequently, 
cutting  borrowing for consumption also  has the consequence of  reducing  the  fiscal 
deficit. 22 
optimal by the policy maker in the developing country. Overcoming  this  conflict will 
require conditionality attached  to the provision  of  credit,  and may justify an active 
role for international institutions in intermediating between the policy maker and the 
22 
international banking system 
5. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Throughout the paper we have  assumed the presence of  a  centralized decision 
maker, who undertakes the decision regarding the default and who implements policies. 
We studied the potential consequences  of overdiscounting  by the policy maker. Our key 
results are that the consequence  of  overdiscounting  is to shift the supply curve  facing 
the  economy  leftwards.  In  the  context  of  desirable  credit  market  policies, 
overdiscounting by the policy  maker increases the tax on  borrowing  for consumption 
purposes  and for investment in sectors that are not biased towards international trade; 
it  also  increases the subsidy for  borrowing  for investment  in sectors heavily  biased 
towards international trade. We conclude  with an outline for a possible extension of  our 
analysis and some qualifying remarks. 
Our discussion provided a rather narrow interpretation  of the optimal policies. We 
terpreted the optimal polices  in  the  form  of  borrowing taxes and  subsidies  that 
generate the proper wedge between the external interest rate facing the economy and 
the internal interest rate facing the representative agent. A dual representation of the 
22.  It  can be  shown  that  if  the policy  maker  is  confronted with  an all-or- 
nothing option  (i.e.,  borrowing  with  the  attached  conditionality or  no  access  to  the 
international credit market) he is better off with the conditionality. 23 
various policies is in the form of  corresponding taxes arid subsidies applied to sectorial 
23 
investment and for the saving and borrowing  decisions 
We  concluded  that  in  the  presence of  overdiscounting the optimal degree  of 
openness  (or  trade  dependency)  exceeds  the  one  ed by  the  policy  maker.  It  is 
noteworthy that our discussion overlooked  several  - : ortant factors that are relevant 
for a more complete determination of  the optimal degree  of  openness.  First, openness 
has the consequence  of  reducing the exposure to domestic shocks,  and  increasing the 
exposure to external shocks. Second, one should recognize that the ability of  developing 
nations to increase openness is conditional  on  the willingness of the developed nations to 
tolerate it. Both factors may dampen the optimal degree  of  openness. Our analysis can 
be extended to account for these factors by allowing  for the presence of domestic and 
foreign shocks  and  by considering  a more symmetric  world where  developing nations 
have a certain market  power. 
Our analysis should be viewed only as an example intended to highlight a  more 
general  point:  country risk  and  overdiscounting by  the  policy  maker  generate  an 
environment where the optimal openness form the point of view of  private agents may 
exceed  the optimal openne  -  :orm  the point of  view  of  the  policy  maker, justifying 
conditionality attached  to  new credit. This  result  should  apply also  to  alternative 
models.  We considered  the  case  where the costs of  default are  the  result  of  trade 
embargo. If one believes  that the default costs are in the form of  embargo on future 
23.  According  to  this  interpretation  agents  are  free  to  borrow  in  the 
international capital market but are taxed (or subsidized)  according  to the domestic 
activities that they choose to engage in. The duality between the two interpretations  of 
the policies discussed  in the paper is similar to the duality between commercial policy 
and the equivalent set of  taxes cum subsidies  on domestic activities (like consumption 
and production). 24 
borrowing  and trade credits, then the optimal policies should  encourage the activities 
that are most vulnerable to a credit embargo.  We modeled the case where the embargo 
is in the form of a hike in the effective price of  imports. If the embargo reduces the 
effective price of exportables, then the policies should also encourage exportabies. 
One important limitation of  our discussion  is that we treat the overdiscouriting 
and the political  infrastructure in the economy as exogenously given.  A  useful extension 
of  the paper may integrate the logic of the present discussion  in a political  economy 
framework, where overdiscounting  is endogenously generated. Another limitation of our 
analysis is with regard to informational assumptions.  We treated the case where there 
is full information on the use of external credit obtained via the central bank, and the 
structure of  optimal policies is conditional  on this information. Suppose,  instead, that 
there is no information on the marginal use of credit due to full fungibility,  and all that 
is known is the average use of funds. In such an economy there is room only for one 
uniform borrowing  tax, whose value is determined as a weighted average of  the taxes 
derived in the present paper, where  the weights reflect the average use of  funds.  In 
general, however, the  policy  maker  has an information set  in  between  these  two 
extreme assumptions:  fungibility  of  funds is feasible for small-scale projects, but may 
be  harder  in  major  projects that  can be  monitored at a  lower  cost.  In  such  an 
ivironment the key results of our paper will hold, after the proper adjustment for 
monitoring costs is made. - 25 - 
APPENDIX 
The purpose  of this Appendix is  to provide a detailed discussion  on the derivations 
of the key equation in the text. Appendix A.1 derives the default penalty endogenously. 
Appendix  A.2  studies the welfare consequences of  exogenous  changes  in  borrowing. 
Appendix  A.3  determines the linkages between openness and the interest  elasticity of 
consumption and  investment  borrowing  and evaluate the  consequence  of  a  raise  in 
overdiscounting  on the supply schedule  facing the economy.  Appendix  A.4  extends the 
discussion to the case of  stochastic productivity. 
Al  The Default Penalty 
In the paper we considered the case where the default penalty 0 is exogenously 
given.  We  start  the  Appendix  by  deriving the  default  penalty  endogenously.  For 
simplicity we give an example of  a two-sectorial economy. Our analysis applies also  to 
an economy  with any number of sectors. Output is produced by domestic and imported 
inputs. The two sectors differ in terms of their reliance on international trade. A default 
results  in  a  rise in  the  price of  imported inputs. The various  sectors  differ in  their 
dependency on importable goods.  For  example,  consider an economy where  output  in 
sector  1 (denoted by X1) is produced  by the following  process: 
(Al)  X1  =  (K (M)'  ;  c  <1; 
where K1  and 
M1  are the capital and the imported inputs used in sector i, and '  is a 
productivity measure. The only difference  between the two sectors is that they differ in 
their dependence on international trade. One  of  them,  sector  1  for  example,  is more 
dependent on international trade (i.e.  <  ).  Thus, we can refer to  as a measure 
of the  openness, or the reliance on international trade of activity i. In the short run, 
the stock of  capital is exogenously  given. We denote the price of the imported input by -  26 - 
and  we assume that  is  deterrnrned by  the  policies  of  the country.  In the 
absence of default the country  faces the international price of  assumed to be unity. 
A default will have the consequence  of  triggering  a penalty due to a trade embargo.  A 
simple way to capture the penalty is to assume that the trade embargo will raise the 
price of  imported inputs at a rate of  such  that in states of  default the  effective 
costs of importables facing the country is exp Pm1' where p> 0. 
Producers in  each  sector maximize profits in  two  ways.  in  the  first  period, 
producers  will choose the optimal investment which will determine the capital stock in 
the second and the third period. Within each period the stock of  capital is given,  and 
producers will choose the imported input M in order  to  maximize profits. Short-run 
profit maximization with respect to the use of importable M yields the following value 
for output 
1/(1 
—  c/(1 - 
(A2)  X1 = 
c1 
1(1- ) 
where  c1 
=  (  )  .  Thus,  a rise  of  from 1 to exp  is associated with a 
change of output at a rate of: 
(A3)  exp C- (p 1(1—  - 1  -  1(1- iPm 
Note  that a portion  of output is spent on the imported input. Thus, the value  added 
- - 27 - 
and (A3) implies that the drop in value added in sector i resulting from the default is 
(1 -  /(1- i11Pm  X  Pm 
Aggregating the drop in the value added across sectors  gives us: 
(A4)  [ 
+  2 X2] m  where 
-  1/(1—.) (1<1  C1 i  1  1 
for i  = 1,2 (c1 are constants ). 
The default penalty can be approximated by the sum  of  output in  the various 
sectors in states of no default, weighted by a measure of the reliance on trade (the  s) 
times the increase in  imported inputs  prices, m•  Equivalently, the default  penalty 
equals the increase in  the  cost  of  imported inputs  resultant  from the default. The 
reliance on international trade (as measured by the importance of  the imported input,  )  plays a key role in determining the relative importance of  sector i in the aggregate 
default penalty. A sector that is shielded from international trade would not play a role 
in the determination of  the aggregate default penalty. These observations will play a 
key role in determining the elasticity of  the interest rate with respect to investment 
(n1)  and  in  determining optimal tax on  borrowing  for investment  in  sector  i.  An 
investment in an activity with a larger 'openness  index  will cause a greater increase 
in the the default penalty, causing a larger increase in the probability of  no default. 
Throughout the paper we treat productivity  as a constant. Appendix A.4  extends the 
discussion to the case where the source of randomness is stochastic productivity. - 28 - 
A.2  The Welfare Consequences  Of Exogenous Changes in Borrowing 
The purpose of  this part is to derive equation (15), determinrng the consequences 
of marginal consumption and investment borrowing  on the expected welfare position  of 
the representative agent. Direct derivation of (14) shows that 
(A5)  V /6  = 
1 +  (1r  -  -  f(s) d 
-  2  -  Q f(s) 
a[(1+r*)J  (j+rw)  11 
Note that  =  r  and J  f(c) d = IT. Thus, 
C  C  S0 
1  I1a[(1+r]  1+rf  B 
f(s)  ds  r  Applying  this  result  to  (AS)  we get, after 
collecting terms, that: 
(A6)  av /aB  = 
1  —  1  Eo  l+rf 
1  [(1+r*)B -  0(1 + 1fl  f(s) — - 
Applying the default rule (8) we get  (1+r)B -  0(1 + 
0  (s - 1). Consequently, 
(A?)  V /aB  = 
1  1  as0  1+rf  B 
1-jQ—(1-so)f(s)--— 
- --- - 29 - 
Applying (9) we get 
i-i  a0  ii 
(A8)  f(s)  n  )  = 
C  C  1  1 
Applying (A8) to (A7),  collecting terms and using the definition  of U [below (15)] we get 
l+r 
(A9)  aV/aB0  1-  ---- [l+—rl0{1+Ufl 
We turn now to the derivation of  V /  1. 
Direct derivation of (14)  shows that 
(Alo)  = 
1  —  O  2  (1+r)B -  QI f(c)  - (jg)  Q 1(c) 
-  lJa[(1+r] 1(c) de + jVMP1 
Applying  the  steps described  in the derivations of  (A6)-(A9) we get, after  collecting 
terms 
(All)  V/l1  {NVMPI -(1+rf)[1+{1+U}]) - 30 - 
Note that 
(Al2)  V =  {ciV / aB0)  B  +  (aV / ai ) 
Applying (A9) and (All)  to  (A12) we obtain equation (15). 
A.3  Openness and the Interest Elasticity  of  Consumption  and  Investment 
Borrowing 
We now turn to the derivation of the value  of the interest rate elasticities with 
respect to consumption  and investment borrowing, r  and 1h Equation (8)  implies  that 
for tB0 , assuming  =  0 for all activities 
(A13) 
Applying equations  (9) and (9) we get 
(A14)  0  = 
f(e0)(1+r) (l  + rM) 
Solving (A13) and (A14) simultaneously  we infer that 
B0 I (0)(1+r) 




The interest  rate elasticity with respect to consumption borrowing  is  zero  for small 
borrowing, and initially it grows with the volume of  borrowing.  We reach  the credit 
cnr 
ceiling  for B  = 
f(s0)(1+r=)(1+8) - 31  - 
We now turn  to the derivation of  the interest  rate elasticity with  respect  to 
investment borrowing. Applying (8) we infer that for  assuming B0 = C and  = 
0 for 
c2 
(A16)  B(1+r)+(1+r=)l1= j 
Applying (A4) we infer that 
(A17)  Q =  MPK m 
where  MPK0  is the marginal product of capital in sector i (in the absence of default). 
Applying (A2) w infer: 
(A18)  MPK.1  r—  K1 
Note  that  equation  (A14)  continues  to  hold.  Solving  (A16)-(A18)  simultaneously, 
applying (A14), we get that 
(A19)  n =  n[1 - sj-] 
where s is the is sector share in the aggregate penalty 
-  - 
i)<n;i+ 2X2 
We can define the openness of a given activity by its contribution to the default penalty 
(s1)  It  is  determined by the reliance on imported inputs, .  A  sector that  does  not -  32 
import  goods has  =  0, and  consequently its share in the penalty  is zero (s =0).  As 
(A19)  reveals, for such a  sector the interest  elasticity with  respect to  investment 
borrowing  in that activity is positive and equals  .  A  higher openness is associated 
with a higher  and s. Inspection  of (A19)  shows that a higher openness of an activity i 
will reduce the interest rate elasticity with respect to investment in that activity. For 
high enough  openness this elasticity may be even negative (for 
Note that we can rewrite (A19) as 
Ii  Ii 
(A19)  fl 
=  - 
Si  flc 
The  elasticity rj is the sum of two terms. The first reflect the move on the given supply 
curve. We refer to this move as the indebtedness  effect (it is obtained from (A16) for 
=  0). The second term  reflect  the shift of  the supply  schedule associated with the 
investment. We refer to this shift as the indebtedness  effect (it is obtained  from  (A16) 
for  .(1 + r*) =  0). 
Note that our analysis considered the case  where the default penalty stems from 
increase in the prices of  imported inputs. A  similar analysis can be made for the 
case where the default reduces the price of exports. 
We now turn to evaluate the consequence  of  a raise in  overdiscounting on  the 
supply schedule  facing  the  economy. The  overdiscounting is  summarized  by  the 
distribution f(e). We will refer to distribution f  as representing a higher overdiscounting 
relative to f if  for all  s  (0  <  e  <1)  the cumulative density of f  is above the cumulative 
density of f, or formally if 
11  11 
(A20)  for all  0  <  e  <1  j  f(s) ds  K  j  f(s) de. 
C  C —  33  - 
We define a distribution fh  for 0 <  h  <  1  by fh =  f + hif - f). We will refer to a rise in 
the  overdiscounting as  a  rise  in  h,  shifting  1h  closer  to  f.  We  will  derive  the 
consequences  of higher overdiscounting  on the supply of credit, or &*/h for a given 
B.  The supply schedule corresponding  to fh is  defined  by equations (8),  (9)  and  (9) 
(replacing  f with fh)• Applying these equations  we can infer that a higher h changes the 
interest rate (for a given borrowing) by 
Q  1 
(A21)  — 
flc  J  [f(c) - 
given borrowing  B0(1+8)fh  0 
(1 
Note that rom the definition  (A20) it follows that j  [f(c) 
—  I (€))d  t >0, thus the sign of 
to 
(A21)  is determined by fl' implying that a rise in overdiscounting  will shift the supply 
curve facing the economy  leftward. - 34 - 
A.4  Stochastic Productivity 
Throughout the paper we assumed that the  only source of  randomness is  the 
uncertainty  regarding the time preference of the decision maker. This assumption was 
made to simplify the discussion.  We close our discussion by extending our analysis to 
the  case  where the source of  uncertainty is  a  stochastic future productivity.  We 
assume that the rate of time preference of the future policy maker equals  e/(1+6), and, 
for simplicity,  we consider now the case where  e  is known with certainty. 
Equations  (1)-(5)  continue  to  hold.  We  now  modify the output  equation by 
allowing for stochastic productivity. Consequently, output  is given by: 
't;i (, n, Kt;i)  if no default occurs 
(6)  = 
''t;i '  d, J<t;i)  if default occurs 
where  is a stochastic productivity term whose density function is given by g,  and we 
assume that  >  0 and tQ/i  > 0. An example of such an economy is provided 
in part  Al.  of  this  Appendix.  While  equation (7)  continues to  apply,  we  modify the 
default rule (8) to reflect the new source of uncertainty. Default will occur if 
(A22)  (t + r (2(1 + 
The  source  of uncertainty is  the future default penalty, which will be determined  in 
our case by the realization of .  Let us define the marginal value  of  the productivity 
shock associated  with default by o: 
(A23)  (1 + rM)  =  Q(o) (1 +  E  th - 35 - 
The interest rate is determined by the equality of  the expected yield to the risk-free 
yield: 
(A24)  1 + rf =  (1  + r*)  g() d 
The expected utility of the representative agent is: 
(A25)  Yi+B  + 
J0(Y2fl-Q)(1+ }g()d+ 
1  q 
[Y2,  R  - (B (1 + r)  +  l1(1+r)} +  Y2,] g() d 
0  i=1 
The source of uncertainty  is now stochastic productivity and not  uncertainty  regarding 
the future discount  rate. Nevertheless, it can be verified that all the results regarding 
policies continue to hold. Specifically, Equations (11)-(13) and (15)-(18)  continue to hold 
subject to the following replacements: c  is replaced by c; Q  is replaced by Q evaluated 
at o (Q(o));  and  NVMP1  is replaced by the expected value  of  NVMP1  (denoted  by 
E{NVMP1D. It can be shown that 
1#r  B 
(15)  V=  {i-  [1+r0(1+U)]}B 
+ 




where U = 
B(1i-r*) 
(1 
— - 36 - 
Applying (15) we  can show that all  the key  results  regarding the consequences of 
overdiscounting and the role of  policies (Sections  3-4) continue to hold  if the source of 
uncertainty is future productivity instead of the future discount factor24. Note that the 
interpretation of productivity shocks is broad, and that one can implement our analysis 
to the  case  where the productivity  uncertainty stems  from uncertainty regarding 
future  terms of trade or regarding future  input prices. 
24.  For example,  a drop  in underdiscounting shifts the supply schedule  to the 
dlogB 
right.  Formally, it can be shown that for a given interest rate  d logE 
=  >  It 
can  be  also  shown  that the characteristics of  optimal conditionality (equations  (16) - 
(18)) continue to hold for the case where  uncertainty  is due to stochastic productivity. - 37 - 
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